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This paper explores whether ownership characteristics, qualified foreign institutional investors, 
geographic distance between the firm’s headquarter and its largest institutional investors, and the 
legal environment a firm operates in affect a firm’s litigation risk in China. Using a comprehensive 
sample of publicly listed firms and a subsample of sued firms from 2009 to 2018, we employ logit 
regression to examine our hypotheses. We find that state ownership, foreign institutional investors, 
and the legal environment have a strong influence on a firm’s risk of being sued. We also find 
negative coefficients for long-term institutional investors' ownership and positive coefficients for 
the distance between the firm and its largest long-term institutional investors, but both coefficients 
are insignificant. Our findings provide important insights into the role of active versus passive 
monitoring in the Chinese market and their effects on a firm’s likelihood to be ousted for alleged 
fraud. 
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In this paper we attempt to answer whether and how internal and external factors affect a 
Chinese firm’s litigation risk. Based on prior studies, we consider four aspects that might have a 
strong relation to the firm’s risk of being sued: (1) state ownership, (2) qualified foreign 
institutional investor (QFII) ownership, (3) the legal environment, and (4) the geographic distance 
between a firm and its largest investors. We argue that the power provided through state ownership 
can serve as form of property rights protection, including reducing the frequency of inspections by 
the government and law enforcement agencies, and alleviating rent-seeking behavior of 
government officials (Zhang, 2005). Similarly, Zhang and Deng (2019) demonstrate that in the past 
decades QFIIs have brought a large amount of capital and advanced investment concepts to the 
Chinese capital market. As a result, they have helped maintain the stability of the securities market 
and have helped promote the healthy development of Chinese capital markets. Also along the same 
line, the rule of law where a listed company is located can help strengthen the supervisory role of 
senior independent directors, allowing them to restrain other employees from violating rules and 
regulations (Quan and Yao, 2015). Finally, Giroud (2013) shows that manufacturing plants that are 
located geographically close to their headquarters can supervise more effectively and can obtain 
higher profits. This also translates to institutional investors who have been found to provide better 
monitoring if they are located close to a given firm (Mazur et al, 2018). 
China is a socialist country, and its people and businesses must adhere to the socialist system. 
One of the most distinctive features of the socialist system is the public ownership of the means of 





whole people, that is, an economy controlled by state-owned firms. Therefore, state-owned entities 
have an overall strategic position in balancing regional development, creating employment 
opportunities, and regulating income redistribution. They occupy a dominant position in important 
industries and key fields that are vital to the national economy in China (Liu, 2016) such as 
electricity, military, and chemical industries. However, political background is an open signaling 
mechanism, which can convey to the market that companies have government relations, thereby 
reducing the probability of litigation (Wang et al., 2019). Therefore, political connections may 
induce firms to take on more risk as it hinders their ability of creating strong monitoring and 
incentive mechanisms. (Zhang, 1999 and Otchere et al., 2020). We investigate the effect of state 
ownership on a firm’s litigation risk. Our results show that there is a negative relationship between 
state ownership and lawsuit incidents, meaning that the presence of state ownership in a firm 
reduces the possibility of a firm being sued. 
Institutional investors usually hold large shares of a firm than individual investors, they have 
professional investment advisors and large investment capabilities, since their interest are closely 
connected to the firm’s performance, institutional investors are more willing to participate in the 
firm management. Carleton et al. (1998) present evidence that institutional investors have greater 
access to a firm’s management and are therefore able to supervise it actively. In a conflict of interest, 
institutional investors can file a proxy resolution to exert their monitoring power over manager’s 
preferences. (Gillan and Starks, 2000). However, a proxy resolution may not be an effective way 
to resolve conflict between investors and management (Karpoff, 2008). On the other hand, 
institutional investors can actively monitor the defendant firm’s managerial irregularities with a 
securities class action (Romano, 1991). Morck et al. (1988), propose two hypotheses to illustrate 





(1) The entrenchment hypothesis suggests that market valuation can be adversely affected by high 
ownership stakes, (2) Convergence of interest hypothesis suggests that larger management 
ownership are associated with higher market value. Consequently, the influence of different types 
of investors on firms is complicated and worth investigating. 
Qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) entered the Chinese market decades ago with 
the gradual relaxation and improvement of QFII policy restrictions. Firstly, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange of China (SAFE) announced that China establish a 
mechanism for qualified financial investment institutions to ease the free flow of domestic and 
foreign capital and promote the efficient allocation of capital. Secondly, the approval procedures 
for overseas investment will be further simplified, and foreign direct investment will only be 
verified for authenticity to encourage foreign investment. Thirdly, the qualified foreign institutional 
investors are allowed to invest in A-shares, government bonds, and corporate bonds approved by 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. As 
a transitional system with limited introduction of foreign capital, qualified foreign institutional 
investor (QFII) has been successful in countries and regions such as South Korea, India, Brazil, 
and China’s Taiwan region since the 1990s, and has greatly promoted the development of the local 
securities market. Thus, the intention of China’s capital market regulators to introduce QFII is to 
use their advanced value investment concepts to promote the stable and healthy development of 
Chinese capital market. These days QFII’s China’s securities market participation has been rising. 
According to the QFII institutions list, released by the CSRC in February 2011, there are 107 QFII 
institutions in China’s capital market, and the total quota of QFII institutions has increased from 
$ 4billion in 2002 to $ 30billion in 2007. Chen et al. (2018) find that most of the QFIIs are well 





QFIIs trade in Taiwan, they have a significant influence on capital market operations (Chen et al., 
2018).  Chang (2010) find that local margin traders, dealers, and mutual funds in Taiwan are 
willing to follow foreign investors to increase or decrease holdings in a particular sector subsequent 
to positive or negative qualified foreign institutional investors order flows. Thus, QFIIs are the 
most important institutional investors in Taiwan’s stock market. In our paper, we find that QFIIs 
do play a monitoring role and decrease the possibility of firms getting sued. This finding could be 
supported by the convergence of interest hypothesis, indicating that the higher the shareholdings 
of QFII, the greater the motivation to improve corporate governance, so that QFII’s participation 
in corporate governance has changed from passive to active supervision, and its positive effects on 
corporate performance continue to expand. Besides, the QFII has a high degree of professionalism 
and strong information gathering capabilities. QFII’s active participation in corporate governance 
can obtain higher investment returns, which will increase with the improvement of corporate 
performance. Therefore, QFII is willing to monitor the firm’s management effectively and actively 
participate in corporate governance.  
When we further consider investment horizons in our model, the outcomes are still in line 
with the hypothesis that firms with qualified foreign institutional investors have a lower litigation 
risk. 
We then analyze the external factor, including the legal aspect of firms in China. Fan et al. 
(2011) report that the level of law environment in different regions of China varies dramatically. 
Since there are 31 provinces in China, their geographical environment are different, the local 
government will have different priorities when they develop the provinces, therefore, the level of 
economic development varies dramatically. Chu and Liu (2015) find that the differences in the 





environment between regions. Also, the effect of implementing the same law in different regions 
will vary depending on the level of economic development in different regions. At the same time, 
the law itself has a time lag effect, there will be many new problems in the development of society, 
and the law can only be formulated with the new problems, so it cannot keep up with the 
development of society. Walder (1995) has proved that the development of China’s legal system is 
far behind the economic development, thus the legal framework plays a very limited role in the 
contract enforcement. Huang et al. (2019), suggest that although China has a unified legal regime, 
there is a large variation in the law enforcement and legal protection of investors among different 
provinces. Jiao et al. (2015) show that the local legal environment has a significantly positive 
influence on firms’ product, technological, process, and management innovation. Huang et al. 
(2019) find that the smaller IPO underpricing for family firms is more pronounced when the firm 
is located in a province with a high quality of legal environment. They also find that proper legal 
protection promotes transparent information disclosure and reduces the verification cost for outside 
investors, and therefore lowers moral hazard and information asymmetry instances between market 
participants. 
In our research we utilize a dataset that includes the all the regions legal environment index 
within China, with it we examine whether the quality of the legal system affects the firm’s litigation 
risk. Furthermore, we also set a high legal variable, which equals to one if the index equals or above 
the median, and 0 otherwise. Our results show that the legal environment could increase the 
frequency and quality of the firm’s trading information disclosure, forcing the firms to trade 
transparently. Therefore, we suggest that a proper legal system decreases information asymmetry, 
guarantees investors protection and increases credit, therefore reducing the firm’s litigation risk.  





consider the physical distance between a firm’s headquarter and its largest institutional investors. 
Talley (2009) shows that institutional investors play an important role in supervising the firm’s 
regulations. For instance, institutional investors could restrain the abuse of power by firm’s 
manager, and could make firms disclosure more transparent, risk control and investment decisions 
more reasonable. In recent research, Mazur et al. (2018) find that the distance effect, between 
institutional investors’ headquarters and a firm’s location, is significantly positive, meaning that 
the larger the distance between the firm and the largest institutional investors, the higher the firm’s 
possibility of the firm being sued. Institutional investors who are located physically close to the 
firm may have informational advantages over institutional investors who are located far away from 
the firm’s headquarters. Closely located investors can therefore conduct effective monitoring of the 
firm’s management, thus decreasing the firm’s litigation risk. 
The results of our findings support those assumptions. In our study, we also take in 
consideration institutional investors investments horizons. We find that the effect of long-term 
institutional investor’s ownership is negative and the effect of distance between the firm and its 
largest long-term institutional investors is positive, but both coefficients are insignificant. 
Furthermore, we evaluate if institutional investors can lessen the distance effect by holding shares 
for a long-time period. The coefficient of the interaction is significantly negative, suggesting that 
the largest institutional investors can weaken the distance effect by participating in the firm’s 
management actively for over four quarters. Thus, firms with long term institutional investors and 
a closely located investors have a lower litigation risk.  
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to the research on state 
owned entities (SOEs), showing that firms with state-controlled background have a lower litigation 





(QFII), showing that with their professional team, rich experience, and strong investment capability, 
can improve the firm’s management, thus decreasing their litigation risk. Next, we build the 
connection between the legal environment and a firm’s litigation risk, and we prove that a well-
functioning legal system monitors firms effectively and forces them to strengthen their 
management, in turn lowering their litigation risk. Finally, following Mazur et al. (2018), we switch 
to Chinese capital market to test the distance effect between a firm’s headquarter and its largest 
institutional investors among the top 5 shareholders. Our results indicate that a firm’s litigation risk 
is significantly lower if institutional investors are located closely to the firm’s headquarters due to 
effective monitoring and an informational advantage. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we review the literature and develop our 
hypotheses. Section 3 we describe the sample data. Section 4 we claim our model specification. 
Empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 5, and our conclusions are presented in 
Section 6. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Litigation risk of firms 
In recent years, China’s firms’ reforms have been fast-growing and far-reaching. However, 
such a scene of prosperity comes with a rapid increase in corporate irregularities. Liu et al. (2016) 
investigate the effect of litigation risk and law on cost of corporate debt financing. Their study 
shows that when Chinese firms facing economic disputes, companies are more willing to resort to 
lawsuits if the private mediation approach is invalid. Litigation is a suboptimal way to solve 





the uncertainty of how the firm can proceed until the final verdict (Wang et al., 2008). Bizjak and 
Coles (1995), Firth et al. (2011), and Lin et al. (2013) examine the effect of inter-firm lawsuits on 
the firm value. These studies find that there is a significant decrease in a firm’s stock price when a 
firm has irregularities. Furthermore, Liu et al. (2016) also find that firms who are involved in a 
lawsuit are more likely to be charged higher debt financing costs.  
Higher litigation risks have a direct effect on the firm’s value, their regular operations and 
their borrowing ability, therefore it is important to determine what aspects can increase or diminish 
the litigation risk for a firm. Our study considers four aspects that might be involved in determining 
this: ownership nature (SOE), qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII), legal environment of 
regions and geographic distance between the largest institutional investors and the firm’s 
headquarters.  
2.2. State owned entities 
Political connections affect corporate outcomes, including firm performance, positively. (Fan 
et al., 2007). Faccio et al. (2006) report that political connections benefit firms by providing them 
with ease of access to licenses, planning permissions and bailouts in times of distress. These studies 
are mainly focused on private listed firms that have political connections, Chinese companies tend 
to be owned, at least partially, by the state; those companies are known as enterprise state owned 
entities (SOEs). Enterprise reforms are carving out the operational units of the SOEs and 
reorganizing them as limited liability companies with share capital and with profit-making 
objectives; even then SOEs play an important role in the Chinese economy, as part of the stake 
remains under control of the state. Local and regional governments hold on average approximately 





the government (Firth et al., 2011). As firms with political affiliations benefit from ease of 
restrictions and bailouts, we believe that SOEs, which are owned by the government, are less likely 
to be sued or more likely to not be punished. We therefore formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that are state controlled have lower litigation risk than private firms. 
2.3. Qualified foreign institutional investors 
Qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII), is a program, launched in 2002 by the Chinese 
government, that gives certain licensed international investors the opportunity to invest in China’s 
stock exchanges. These investment opportunities include the buying and selling of yuan-
denominated " A " shares of Chinese companies. This program mainly aims to introduce foreign 
capital and to standardize the market by their advanced value investment concept. Huang and Shiu 
(2009) find that firms with a larger proportion of qualified institutional investors (QFIIs) perform 
better than firms have a lower percentage of QFIIs. Wu et al. (2011) point out that the qualified 
foreign institutional investor (QFII) plays an important and positive role as an investor in China’s 
A-share market and firms with QFIIs are superior to those without QFIIs in terms of profitability, 
operational capability, and corporate governance quality. Further, they also report that the existence 
of the QFII in a firm can improve the firm’s performance, In China, foreign investors prefer large 
companies with low book-to-market ratios as those firms have less information asymmetry (Lin 
and Shiu, 2003). Additionally, QFIIs may also have a preference for larger well-known firms with 
some element of state ownership, lower liability levels, and greater turnover capacity (Liu et al., 
2020). 
So far, we find that most of the studies mainly focus on the QFII investment preference, 





of QFII’s presence on a firm’s litigation risk. Therefore, we aim to provide new and additional 
insights into the question of how the qualified foreign institutional investors can affect the firm’s 
possibility of getting sued. The hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with a higher ownership by qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) 
have lower litigation risk than firms with lower ownership by QFII. 
To further investigate potential differences in the effect of long-term and short-term investors, 
we set a dummy variable, which equals to one if the qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) 
holds shares for at least four quarters, otherwise it equals to zero to further test our hypothesis. 
2.4. Legal environment 
The legal environment has an important influence on the capital market. There are 31 
provinces in China, but the process of rule of law are different among different regions because the 
different level of economic development will affect the enforcement of legal provisions in various 
regions. Fan et al. (2011) point out that the development of China’s judicial system lags far behind 
the reform and development of the economy. Chen and Shiu (2007) show that the differences in 
the capital structure of the listed companies in different countries are partly due to the differences 
of the county’s legal and institutional environments. Yu (2007) indicates that when the legal system 
of a region or country is well functioning firms in that region or country will disclose detailed and 
high-grade information. He also finds that there is a positive relationship between firm value and 
the law environment of regions, meaning that higher level of law will be accompanied with a higher 
firm value. Hasan et al. (2008) investigate Asian emerging markets and suggest that improvements 
in the corporate governance, such as legal environment and investor rights, will lessen the 





way for controlling shareholders to transfer the interests, in the region where the legal environment 
is highly developed and provides protections to investors, the higher the legal risk will be faced by 
the controlling shareholder’s encroachment on the interests of small and medium-sized 
shareholders, thus controlling shareholders occupy less capital (Qiu and Rao, 2007).  
 When the legal system is well functioning disclosure is more effective, thus investors are better 
informed and the firm can generate more value, due to this our third hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 3: Firms that operate in provinces with a high-quality legal environment have lower 
litigation risk than firms that operate in provinces with a lower quality legal environment. 
The integrity of the legal system shall be different among 31 provinces in China. To account 
for potential differences, we set a dummy variable, HLegal, which equals to one if the legal index 
is equal or above the median of the index, and zero otherwise. 
2.5. Geographic distance 
In our paper, we also focus on the distance between institutional investors and the firm’s 
headquarters. Lawsuits decrease significantly the sued firm’s stock price on the date of the lawsuit 
filing (Bhagat et al., 1998, Gande and Lewis, 2009). Stakeholders will then experience huge losses 
if the firm where they hold stock is sued. Costs that derive from the conflicts between stakeholders 
and managers decline when the management ownership increases (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
As their stakes rise, managers are less likely to damage the corporate wealth. Morck et al. (1988) 
also demonstrate that according to the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, the market value 
increases with the increase of management ownership. However, they also point out that market 
valuation can be adversely affected by high ownership stakes based on the entrenchment hypothesis.  





information could mitigate information asymmetry problems and allow the stock price to better 
reflect the firm’s real value. Talley (2009) and Cheng et al. (2010) prove that the institutional 
investors can significantly affect a firm’s litigation risk. We therefore wonder if institutional 
investors could actively and effectively supervise the company’s management. Therefore, we come 
out of the hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.1: Firms with larger institutional ownership face lower litigation risk than firms 
with lower institutional ownership. 
Past studies have proved that the geographical distance matters. For instance, Choi et al. (2012) 
analyze how the geographic distance between the auditor and the client affects audit quality. They 
find that there exists a positive effect between the auditor geographic distance and the quality of 
the audit, the shorter the distance the better was the audit quality. Li (2015) investigates how the 
physical distance between the parent and subsidiary companies affects the corporate governance 
and investment behavior of stakeholders. He shows that with an increase in the distance between 
the parent and subsidiary company the level of corporate governance lowers and the overinvesting 
behavior becomes more frequent. In our study we attempt to determine if investors’ geographical 
proximity to the firm’s headquarters will influence the firm’s litigation risk, we also investigate 
whether the effect of geographic distance will be different considering long and short investment 
horizons, thus, the hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.2: Firms that have a larger geographical distance to their largest institutional 
investors face a higher litigation risk than firms that operate in proximity to their 
largest institutional investors. 
Hypothesis 4.3: Firms that have a closer geographical distance to their largest long-term 





their largest institutional investors. 
3. Data description 
3.1. Data 
We use four sources to collect information: CSRC, CSMAR, Auto Navi map and the Fan-
gang index. We examine all published CSRC enforcement actions with filing dates between 
January 2009 and December 2018. Since the Securities Law promulgated in December 1998, 
CSRC is the sole regulator of listed companies, stock exchanges, and securities firms. We classify 
firm’s lawsuits in 16 groups by the type of violation and by industry into six groups as we list in 
Table 2. Initially, there are 1950 observations in our sample from 2009 to 2018. All the market data 
that we use are collected from CSMAR quarterly files.  From the CSMAR database we collect 
information on the ownership nature, the percentage of QFII ownership and the address of the listed 
firms. All listed firms’ and institutional investors’ coordinates are collected manually from the Auto 
Navi map. The legal environment part, the index we use to represent law environment of a province 
is from the Fan-gang index, which consists of six indices: (1) total market index; (2) relationship 
between government and markets index; (3) the development of non-state business index; (4) 
development of product markets index; (5) development of factor markets index; (6) development 
of market intermediaries and legal environment index. Higher scores equate to greater legal 
development. The latest Fan-gang index only updates to 2016, thus in this part, our sample period 
is from 2009 to 2016.  
For sued firms, we match financial statement information one quarter prior to their lawsuit 





of violated firms contains 2587 observations. Finally, we include all non-sued firms in the CSMAR 
database as a comparison benchmark. 
3.2. Variables 
First, we define Sued as our litigation variable, which equals one if the firm violates the 
regulations during the sample period, otherwise it equals zero. Next, we set different independent 
variables for each aspects. For state owned entities (SOEs), we set the variable Stateowned, which 
equals one when the listed firms are SOEs and zero otherwise. We define the QFII variable as the 
total ownership of the qualified foreign institutional investors, which equals the percentage of the 
QFII ownership. Further, in our analysis, we distinguish the difference between long- and short-
term investors. We create LOwnQ, if the qualified foreign institutional investors hold shares at least 
the last four quarters it is considered long-term investors and the variable equals one, otherwise it 
equals zero. We define the Legal represents for the legal environment index. We also set another 
dummy variable, HLegal, which equals one if the index is equal or above the median of the legal 
environment index, and zero otherwise. To calculate the geographical distance between 
institutional investors and the firm’s headquarters we use the procedure used by Mazur et al. (2018) 
as a reference. We first identify the institutional investors among the top five shareholders of the 
firm, and we create the Own variable (total ownership by the largest institutional investor) and the 
Dist variable (average distance between the firm and the largest institutional investors). Specifically, 
we construct a measure of geographic distance at the end of each quarter. For each firm, we 
calculate the equally weighted average distance between the firm’s headquarters and each 
institutional investor among the top 5 shareholders. Then we aggregate institutional ownership 





variable, Long, which equals one if the largest institutional investor hold shares for at least the last 
four quarters, otherwise it equals zero. LongOwn and LongDist represent the total ownership of 
the long term institutional investors and average distance between the firm and the largest 
institutional investors. 
Finally, we define several control variables that might affect the firm’s litigation risk based on 
the previous research. Our control variables are: firm size, return on asset, stock return, book-to-
market ratio, Tobin’s Q, financial leverage, and audit information. We use the natural log of a firm’s 
total assets to measure the size of the firm (Lsize). Alexander (1991) points out that large firms 
might be more likely to be sued because they allow investors to extract larger settlements. However, 
institutional investors are more willing to monitor the firm’s management effectively and affect the 
firm’s decisions when they have a large investment in a large firm (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Morck 
et al.,1988). Thus, the impact of this variable needs to be controlled. Besides, to control the firm’s 
profitability, we select return on assets (ROA). Next, we control the firm’s performance by adding 
firm’s stock return (Stock return), book-to-market ratio (BM), and Tobin’s Q. We consider that 
higher stock return and Tobin’s Q and lower book-to-market ratio are a positive sign of firm’s 
performance, which means these kinds of firms face a lower risk of being sued. Lev (1974) tests a 
sample of companies and finds a positive relationship between leverage and the risk of the firms. 
Additionally, Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) mention that high leverage firms are more frequently 
involved in fraud. Therefore, we also include financial leverage (Leverage) in our model. We argue 
that auditors from Big Four accounting firms may help firms improve their management and 
monitor their activities, in that way firms are less likely to be sued , thus, we create a dummy 
variable, Big4, indicating whether a firm’s auditor is from Big Four accounting firms or not. We 





the influence of the outliers. In Table 1 we will provide more details of the definition and source of 
all the data we mentioned above. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
In Table 2 we provide descriptive statistics for the firm’s sued data, independent variables of 
the four parts, and all control variables we used in our test. Furthermore, we report the results of 
the t-test of the sued and non-sued groups.  
Panel A shows the basic information of 1432 violated firms in our sample. In detail, we class 
the violated firms by year, by industry, and by allegation type. All classifications are based on the 
criterion provided by the CSMAR database. We have 1432 violated firms, but the total numbers of 
the last group is different from the former two groups. That is because firms might violate multiple 
regulations at the same time, thus, some of the firms may count multiple times, so the total 
observations for the three groups are different. In the first classification, there is a sharp increase 
of violated firms in 2012, the amount does not vary as much from 2012 to 2018. People’s Daily 
Online (2013) reports that half of the listed firms had a strong incentive to whitewash their financial 
statements, which led to a surge in corporate violations. Industrial firms account for more than 66 % 
of all industries. Financial firms have the lowest amount of the lawsuits, which only accounts for 
4 % of all industries during the sample period. Panel A also reports that others account for 29.9 % 
of all violations, and delayed disclosure takes the second place, which accounts for 20.7 %. Stock 
manipulation is very rare during the sample period, which only accounts for 0.03 %.   
Panel B of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the key variables and control variables of 
sued and non-sued firm. We also provide the results for the mean and median equality tests of the 





between the two groups, which indicates initial evidence that these variables have a strong 
influence on the firm’s litigation risk. For example, the mean and median of the legal environment 
index (Legal) and the total ownership of largest institutional investors among the top 5 shareholders 
(Own) are significantly higher for non-sued firms than for sued firms (both significant at the 1 % 
level), while the median of the distance between firms and their largest institutional investors 
among the top 5 shareholders is significantly higher for sued firms than for non-sued firms 
(significant at 5 % level), indicating that if the firm is in a province with a highly developed legal 
system or institutional investors are closely located to the firm’s headquarters, the firm is less likely 
to be sued. Besides, the equality tests show that state owned nature (Stateowned) and the long-term 
ownership of QFII (LOwnQ) are significantly higher (at the 1 % level of significance) for non-sued 
firms than for sued firms.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Model specification 
In this section we specify our model for each part based on our sample separately. We choose 
the logit model for our test since the variable of lawsuits is a binary qualitative variable. 
4.1. The effect of the state-controlled ownership on litigation risk 
To test Hypothesis 1, we start to examine how the state ownership nature affects the firms’ 
litigation risk by logit regression. Specifically, we create θi stands for the likelihood of a lawsuit, 
thus, 1-θi represents the likelihood of no lawsuit. Given the logit=ln(θi / (1-θi)) as the dependent 










where Suedi is a dummy variable, which equals to one if firm i is violated during the sample 
period, otherwise it equals zero. Stateowned equals to one if firm i is state-controlled and 
Controlsi,m are m variables based on the relevant literature and are demonstrated in detail in Table 
1. We also control year and industry fixed effects in our model. 
4.2. The effect of the QFII on litigation risk 
To examine Hypothesis 2, we test whether the existence of qualified foreign institutional 
investor (QFII) has a significant effect on the irregularities of a firm. Furthermore, we try to figure 
out the potential difference when considering investment horizons. Using the same model we 




where QFIIi denotes the ownership of the qualified foreign institutional investors during our 
sample period, estimated as the total ownership by the qualified foreign institutional investors 
(QFIIs). LOwnQi is a dummy variable that equals to one if the qualified foreign institutional 
investor (QFII) holds shares in a firm for at least the last four quarters, and zero otherwise. We 



























































4.3. The effect of the legal environment on litigation risk 
For testing Hypothesis 3, we select the legal index from the Fan-gang index to represent the 
province development level. Liu et al. (2016) point out that the effect of companies’ pending 
litigation on their bank credit loan cost is more severe in the regions with a poor law environment. 
Also, Yu (2007) reports that the higher level of law environment in the region, the more transparent 
the trading information at the time of the company’s litigation. In contrast, regions with a relatively 
low legal environment have lower transparency making it more difficult for banks to obtain detailed 
information about a company’s litigation through the restrictive mechanism of laws and regulations. 
Inspired by these studies, we decide to find out the potential difference between the undeveloped 




where Legali measures the quality of the legal environment of the province in which the firm 
is headquartered. Further we set another vairable, HLegali, which is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the legal environment index is equal or above the median of the legal environment index, 
and zero otherwise. Finally, we include Legali, HLegali, and their interaction in the full model. Year 
and industry fixed effects are also controlled. 
4.4. The effect of the geographic distance on litigation risk 
To examine Hypothesis 4.1, we first want to confirm that institutional investors affect the 
firm’s litigation risk. After, to support Hypothesis 4.2, we test how does the geographic distance 
































litigation risk. Finally, for the Hypothesis 4.3, we investigate whether investment horizons affects 
our results and if the distance effect is weakened when institutional investors hold shares for a long 
time period. Thus, we employ long term variables like LongOwni, LongDisti, LOwnQi, and their 









All variables except independent variables are all the same as we defined in section 4.1. In 
equation (4.1), Owni represents the total ownership of the institutional investors in the firm. In 
equation (4.2), Disti denotes the average geographic distance between the largest institutional 
investors among the top five shareholders and the firm. In equation (4.3), LongOwni represents the 
total ownership of institutional investors who hold shares for at least four quarters; the remaining 
shareholders are considered short term investors. LongDisti represents the average distance of 




















































































































distance of short-term institutional investors. LOwnQi is the variable that we define in part 2, equals 
one if the qualified foreign institutional investors hold shares for at least the last four quarters, and 
zero otherwise. The reason why we add LOwnQ here is because the distance between a firm’s 
headquarters and its qualified foreign institutional investors is relatively far, based on our 
expectations that distance effect is positive and the institutional ownership effect is negative, we 
wonder whether the qualified foreign institutional investors hold shares for a long time could take 
the edge off the distance effect. In addition to the above model specifications, we also consider 
models in which we employ interaction terms of LongDisti * LongOwni and Disti * LOwnQi. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. The effect of the state-controlled ownership on litigation risk 
Table 3 reports the results for the full sample of our logistic regression estimations. Model 1 
shows the results for the regression that only includes the control variables. Models 2 includes the 
independent variable Stateowned and control variables. The coefficient of Stateowned is 
significantly negative (at the 1 % level of significance), which means the result is in line with our 
Hypothesis 1 that firms with state-controlled ownership have lower litigation risk than those private 
firms. Besides, we see that our control variables, financial leverage (leverage) have a positive 
coefficient (at the 1 % level of significance), which is consistent with Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
that firms with a higher leverage will engage in fraud more frequently. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
5.2. The effect of the QFII on litigation risk 





regression. In Model 1 we test the effect of the QFII on the firm’s litigation risk without considering 
investment horizons. Model 2 includes the control variables and the long-term qualified foreign 
institutional investors which equals one if the qualified foreign institutional investors hold shares 
for at least last four quarters and zero otherwise. All coefficients of the ownership and long term 
variables in the model are significantly negative. Model 3 represents the full model as expressed 
by equation (2). The interaction of QFII * LOwnQ is positive, but it is insignificant. Overall, we 
suggest that the results are in line with our Hypothesis 2: firms which have qualified foreign 
institutional investors, especially long term investors, have lower litigation risk than firms without 
them. Such results confirm the previous points of view again that the qualified foreign institutional 
investors could urge the firm’s managers to improve corporate performance, alleviate agency cost 
and protect shareholders’ rights and interests (Zhang and Deng, 2019). However, Wu et al. (2011) 
find that QFIIs tend to invest in large, reputable, and well performing firms. Therefore, further 
testing should be done to examine whether QFIIs lower the litigation risk of firms with their 
expertise and effective monitoring, or if the firms already had a lower litigation risk and QFIIs were 
simply attracted to them.    
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
5.3. The effect of the legal environment on litigation risk 
Table 5 reports the results of the effect of the legal environment for the sample of our logistic 
regression estimations. Model 1 tests the general effect of the law environment on the firm’s 
litigation risk. The coefficient of Legal is significantly negative. In Model 2, we further create a 
dummy (HLegal) which equals one if the legal index is equal or above the median of the legal 





negative. Model 3 represents the full model as expressed in equation (3). Since the coefficient Legal 
and HLegal are both significantly negative, we create Legal * HLegal interaction term as a further 
support to our result. We find that the coefficient of the interaction Legal * HLegal is significantly 
negative. The result is consistent with the former two tests, giving further support to our 
assumptions that highly developed legal systems would force the firm to trade transparently and 
execute effective management regulations, thus, the legal environment does matter; firms that 
operate in provinces with a high quality legal environment have a lower litigation risk than firms 
operating in provinces with a poor legal environment. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.4. The effect of the geographic distance on litigation risk 
Table 6 reports the results of the geographic distance effect on litigation risk by logit regression. 
Model 1 and Model 2 show the results of distance and ownership variables with control variables 
separately. We find that the institutional investor’s ownership effect is significantly negative, and 
the distance effect is significantly positive. In Model 3, we test full model that includes both 
ownership and distance variables and their interaction. These outcomes are consistent with Talley 
(2009) and Cheng et al. (2010) where they suggest that institutional investors have a strong effect 
on the firm’s litigation risk. This is also in line with our Hypothesis 4.1 indicating that firms with 
institutional investors have a lower litigation risk than firms without institutional investors. 
Additionally, it confirms our Hypothesis 4.2, supporting the claim that a close distance between 
the largest institutional investors and the firm decreases the firm’s litigation risk.  
Next, in Model 4 and 5, we consider ownership and distance variables with investment 





shares for at least last four quarters, and zero otherwise. Then we create LongOwn equals Long * 
Own and LongDist equals Long * Dist in order to test whether investment horizons would affect 
our results. Although the coefficient of the LongOwn is negative and the coefficient of LongDist 
is positive, they both lose the significance, indicating that investment horizons will not affect the 
firm’s litigation risk. Model 6 represents the full model of both LongOwn and LongDist variables 
and their interaction. The meaning of this model is that we try to find whether the institutional 
investors hold shares for a long period would weaken the distance effect on the firm’s litigation 
risk. The coefficient of the interaction is significantly negative, indicating that long investment 
horizons can alleviate the distance effect. Model 7 is an extension that we want to see whether the 
long holding period of qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) could weaken the distance 
effect. Although the coefficient of the interaction is negative it is also insignificant, therefore, we 
suggest the impact of the long term qualified foreign institutional investors on the distance effect 
is weak. The coefficient of the LOwnQ is significantly negative, which give extra support to our 
Hypothesis 2 and our Hypothesis 4.1, indicating that the presence of institutional investors affects 
the firm’s litigation risk. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
6. Discussion 
Our paper generally consists of four aspects that might have effects on the firm’s litigation risk. 
First, we investigate how state-owned ownership affects the firm’s litigation risk. Most of the extant 
studies are mainly focused on private listed firms who have political connections benefit from them. 
We investigate SOEs, where the political backgrounds are much stronger than those of private firms. 





find out the true effect of state-owned ownership on the firm’s litigation risk. Our result supports 
our hypothesis, firms controlled by the state have a lower possibility of being sued compared to 
private firms. However, we could not claim that the government would be a good supervisor and 
effective monitor of the firm’s management to help reduce the firm’s fraudulent activities, it may 
also because of the risk aversion of managers or the hesitation of the affected parties to sue an 
enterprise owned by the government. 
In the second part we wonder if different types of investors would have a different effect on 
the firm’s litigation risk. Prior research has proved that the presence of QFII improves the firm’s 
performance, alleviates the agency cost, and it has a positive influence on the firm’s market value 
(Zhang and Deng, 2019). Our results support hypothesis 2, showing that firms with qualified 
foreign institutional investors (QFIIs), especially long-term investors, significantly decline their 
litigation risk. However, we still are not clear whether the low litigation risk is partly because of 
the qualified foreign institutional investor’s effective monitoring, or the QFII tends to invest in 
firms with good performance and reputations, which means the firms themselves have a low 
litigation risk. We expect that further research could give us more explicit suggestions.  
After considering the investor’s type, we switch to investigate the external environment. China 
has 31 provinces and the level of legal environment development varies greatly among the regions, 
so we posit that the legal system would also affect the firm’s regulations and decisions, thus 
affecting the firm’s possibility of being sued. Using the data from 2009 to 2016 and the legal 
environment index from the Fan-gang index, we show that higher legal environment index could 
decrease the possibility of firms being sued. When we employ dummy variable Hlegal, trying to 
find potential difference between high and low legal environment index, the result is still in line 





lower litigation risk than firms in provinces with a poor legal environment.  
The last part is motivated by Mazur et al. (2018), where they examine the geographic distance 
effect on the firm’s litigation risk. To the best of our knowledge, studies mainly focus on the effect 
of the distance between a company and its subsidiaries on investment behaviors of Chinese 
investors (Li, 2015). Our research tests the relationship between the geographic distance of 
institutional investors among the top five shareholders and the litigation risk of firms. Using a 
sample of shareholder irregularities, we test our data by using the logit model. We find that the 
coefficient of the geographic distance is significantly positive and the coefficient of the ownership 
of the largest institutional investors is significantly negative, indicating that institutional investors 
who are located closer to the firm’s headquarters and firms with large proportion of ownership held 
by institutional investors, have a lower possibility of being sued. We also consider investment 
horizons and we find that although the sign of the coefficients is consistent with the ownership and 
distance variables, the impact of long term investment horizons does not change our results, thus 
long-term investment horizons have a weak effect on the litigation risk. However, the interaction 
of the LongOwn and LongDist is significantly negative, meaning that the long-term investment 
horizons would mitigate the distance effect. Furthermore, we test long term qualified foreign 
institutional investors and distance effect together. The coefficient of the interaction is negative and 
insignificant, indicating that long term investment horizons of qualified foreign institutional 
investors do not influence the distance effect. Ultimately, close distances allow institutional 
investors to conveniently participate in the firm’s management, allowing them to gather insider 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
This table provides variable definitions and data sources for all variables used in our analysis. We list the state 
ownership-related variables in Part 1, the foreign investor related variables in Part 2, the legal environment-related 
variables in Part 3, and the geographic distance-related variables in Part 4. For all variables in this group (the 
geographic distance variables) that use distance, the distance measures between the firms and the investors are 
calculated based on the geographic coordinates of the corresponding entities. The formula is as follows: 
Distancef;i=r*arccos{sin(latf)*sin(lati)+cos(latf)*cos(lati)*cos(lonf-loni)}, where f and i denote the firm and the investor, 




Variables Definition Source 
Main variable of interest 
Sued Dummy variable, equal to one if the firm was sued during the 
sample period, and zero otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms 
Research Series - CSRC 
Enforcement Actions 
Part 1: State ownership variables 
Stateowned Dummy variable, equal to one if a firm is controlled by the 
state, and zero otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms 
Research Series - Equity 
Nature 
Part 2: Qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) variables 
QFII The percentage ownership by qualified foreign institutional 
investors (QFII) in a firm. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms 
Research Series - Institutional 
Investors 
LOwnQ Long term QFII, a dummy variable, which equals one if the 
qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) holds shares for at 
least the last four quarters, and zero otherwise. 
Same as above 
 
 37 
Table 1: Variable definitions—continued 
(Continued) 
Part 3: Legal environment variables 
Legal Development of market intermediaries and the legal 
environment index, a sub-category of the Fan-Gang Index 
which is estimated by Fan Gang and published in the 2018 
NERI Report. 
Marketization Index of 
China’s Provinces: NERI 
Report 2018 
HLegal Dummy variable, equals to one if the legal index of a province 
is equal to or above the median of the legal indexes for all 
provinces; otherwise it is zero.  
Same as above 
Part 4: Geographic distance variables 
Dist Average distance between the firm and its largest institutional 
investors among the top 5 shareholders. This variable is 
estimated as the equally weighted average distance, in hundreds 
of miles (only those investors are include in the distance 
calculation for whom location data were available). 
Investor coordinates collected 
from map website. CSMAR: 
China Listed Firms Research 
Series - China’s Listed Firms’ 
Basic Information 
Own Total ownership of the largest institutional investors among the 
top 5 shareholders. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firm 
Research Series - Top 10 
Shareholders 
Long Dummy variable, equal to one if the largest institutional 
investors hold shares for at least four quarters, and zero 
otherwise. 
Same as above 
LongDist Equals Long*Dist Same as above 
LongOwn Equals Long*Own Same as above 
 
 38 
Table 1: Variable definitions—continued 
  
Control variables 
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
ROA Net income over total assets. CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Financial Statements Database 
Stock return Average of the daily stock returns during a one-year window 
ending one quarter prior to the lawsuit filing quarter. 
CSMAR: China Stock Market 
Series - Stock Trading 
BM Total assets over market value. CSMAR: China Listed Firms 
Research Series - Financial 
Indices 
Tobin’s Q Sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt 
over the sum of the book value of equity and the book value of 
debt. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms 
Research Series - Financial 
Indices 
Leverage Book value of total liabilities over book value of total assets. CSMAR: China Listed Firms 
Research Series - Financial 
Indices - Risk Level 
Audit Dummy variable, equals to one if a firm’s auditor is a Big Four 
accounting firm, and 0 otherwise. 
CSMAR: China Listed Firms 




Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics (i.e., the mean, median, and standard deviation) as well as the results for mean 
and median equality tests for all sample variables. Panel A provides basic information for the number of lawsuits from 
2009 to 2018, classified by year, industry, and violation type. The total number of observations in the last column is 
different from those in columns 2 and 4 because many of our sample firms were accused of violating multiple 
regulations at the same time. Panel B provides summary statistics relating to state ownership, qualified foreign 
institutional investor (QFII) ownership, the legal environment index, and the geographic distance between firms and 
their largest institutional investors with pairwise differences in means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon test) between the 
subgroups. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (Continued) 
  
Panel A: Litigation time series by year, industry, and violation type 
Distribution by year Distribution by industry Distribution by violation type 
Year N Industry class N Type N 
2009 94 Finance 98 Fictitious Profit 126 
2010 115 Public Utility 369 Fictitious Assets 15 
2011 199 Properties 164 False Recording 749 
2012 335 Conglomerates 105 Delayed Disclosure 1,250 
2013 344 Industrials 1696 Material Omission 992 
2014 289 Commerce 155 False Disclosure (Other) 291 
2015 286   Fraudulent Listing 3 
2016 312   Unauthorized Fund Use 70 
2017 280   Corporate Assets Occupied 149 
2018 333   Insider Trading 3 
    Illegal Stock Trading 53 
    Stock Price Manipulation 2 
    Illegal Guarantee 94 
    Mishandling of General Accounting 442 
    Others 1809 
Total: 2,587  2,587  6,048 
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Table 2: Summary statistics—continued 
 
 
Panel B: Mean and median equality tests between the two sub-samples. 
Variable Sued firms Non-sued firms t-test Wilcoxon test 






2,098 0.345 0.000 86,489 0.391 0.000 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
QFII 
1,697 0.001 0.000 72,039 0.001 0.000 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
LOwnQ 
1,697 0.029 0.000 72,039 0.050 0.000 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
Legal 
1,634 8.315 7.400 63,339 9.136 8.620 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
HLegal 
1,634 0.442 0.000 63,339 0.505 1.000 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
Own 
975 0.051 0.030 41,475 0.058 0.032 
0.006*** 0.005*** 
Dist 
975 7.163 6.642 41,475 6.994 6.589 
0.321 0.045** 
LongOwn 
1,144 0.038 0.015 50,873 0.042 0.016 
0.070* 0.739 
LongDist 
1,144 4.121 2.255 50,873 4.033 1.946 
0.571 0.246 
Lsize 
2,098 8.230 8.060 86,492 8.307 8.100 
0.008*** 0.109 
ROA 
2,098 0.026 0.015 86,492 0.035 0.023 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
Stock return 
2,098 0.001 0.000 86,492 0.001 0.000 
0.000*** 0.110 
BM 
2,098 0.608 0.616 86,492 0.603 0.603 
0.412 0.204 
Tobin’s Q 
2,098 2.638 2.016 86,492 2.735 2.104 
0.030** 0.011** 
Leverage 
2,098 1.878 1.151 86,492 1.483 1.083 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
Audit 




Table 3: The effect of state ownership on corporate litigation risk 
This table reports the results for the full sample of estimations of state-owned ownership. We use binary logistic 
regression which we formulate in section 4.1. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Model 1 only include 
control variables, Model 2 we add our independent variable in. We also control year and industry fixed effects in our 
models. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
The effect of state ownership on corporate litigation risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 
State owned  -0.222*** 
  (0.001) 
Lsize -0.042 -0.014 
 (0.136) (0.629) 
ROA -7.602*** -7.852*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock return -10.800*** -10.934*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
BM -0.102 -0.150 
 (0.556) (0.388) 
Tobin’s Q 0.008 0.002 
 (0.659 ) (0.926) 
Leverage 0.067*** 0.070*** 
 (0.000 ) (0.009) 
Audit -0.687*** -0.691*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -3.285*** -3.332*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes 
Observations 88,590 88,587 
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.024 




Table 4: The effect of qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) ownership on a firm’s litigation risk 
This table reports the results for the full sample of estimations of the QFII ownership. We use binary logistic regression 
which we formulate in section 4.2. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. Model 1 includes the ownership 
variable which denotes the total QFII ownership in a firm. Model 2 shows the result of long term QFII effect, LOwnQ 
equals one if the QFII hold shares for at least four quarters, and zero otherwise. Models 3 shows the full model that 
contains the interaction of QFII and the dummy LOwnQ. Year and industry fixed effects are controlled in our models. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
The effect of qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) ownership on a firm’s litigation risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
QFII -14.822**  -6.951 
 (0.046)  (0.358) 
LOwnQ  -0.370** -0.581*** 
  (0.018) (0.000) 
QFII*LOwnQ   11.390 
   (0.145) 
Lsize -0.018 -0.017 -0.015 
 (0.561) (0.590) (0.683) 
ROA -7.699*** -7.673*** -7.481*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return -11.652*** -11.702*** -11.279*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) 
BM -0.069 -0.069 0.076 
 (0.717) (0.720) (0.685) 
Tobin’s Q 0.012 0.012 0.011 
 (0.574) (0.583) (0.567) 
Leverage 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.073*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Audit -0.771*** -0.766*** -0.746*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Intercept -3.457*** -3.495*** -3.518*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 73,736 73,736 73,736 
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.025 0.026 




Table 5: The effect of the legal environment on a firm’s litigation risk 
This table reports the results for the full sample of estimations of the legal environment index. Model 1 tests the effect 
of legal environment index of different provinces. Model 2 includes the control variables and the dummy variable 
HLegal, which equals one if the legal index is equal or above the median of the index, otherwise it equals zero. Models 
3 shows the results for the full model that includes the interaction of Legal and HLegal. Year and industry fixed effects 
are controlled in our models. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
The effect of the legal environment on a firm’s litigation risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Legal -0.043***  -0.009 
 (0.000)  (0.676) 
HLegal  -0.316*** 0.703*** 
  (0.000) (0.003) 
Legal*HLegal   -0.073*** 
   (0.007) 
Lsize -0.056* -0.051 -0.051 
 (0.082) (0.111) (0.111) 
ROA -5.548*** -5.663*** -5.592*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock return -5.862 -5.995 -5.949 
 (0.115) (0.107) (0.113) 
BM 0.014 -0.012 0.002 
 (0.941) (0.948) (0.991) 
Tobin’s Q 0.021 0.021 0.023 
 (0.258) (0.275) (0.223) 
Leverage 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Audit -0.526*** -0.540*** -0.553*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) 
Intercept -3.098*** -3.288*** -3.307*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 64973 64973 64973 
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.024 0.027 
Chi-square (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 6: The effect of geographic distance between the firm and its largest institutional investors on the firm’s 
litigation risk  
This table reports the results for the full sample of estimations of geographic distance. Model 1 and 2 test the effect of 
total ownership of largest institutional investors in a firm and average distance between the firm and its largest 
institutional investors. Model 3 is a full model that includes the interaction of ownership and distance. Model 4 and 5 
we separately test the effect of long term institutional investors’ ownership and the distance between the firm and the 
long term investors. Model 6 shows the full model that includes long term variables and their interactions. Model 7 
includes distance variable and long term QFII variable together, trying to find whether the presence of the long term 
QFII could weaken the distance effect or not. 
The effect of geographic distance between the firm and its largest institutional investors on the firm’s litigation risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Dist  0.007** 0.014*    0.013 
  (0.046) (0.067)    (0.192) 
Own -0.732*  0.081     
 (0.073)  (0.936)     
LOwnQ       -0.593*** 
       (0.000) 
Own*Dist   -0.156     
   (0.193)     
LongDist     0.007 0.017***  
     (0.197) (0.000)  
LongOwn    -0.258  0.494  
    (0.375)  (0.483)  
LongOwn*Dist      -0.210***  
      (0.000)  
LOwnQ*Dist       -0.011 
       (0.238) 
Lsize -0.031 -0.043 -0.028 -0.053 -0.060 -0.052 -0.013 
 (0.537) (0.382) (0.525) (0.253) (0.176) (0.270) (0.815) 
(Continued)   
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Table 6: Geographic distance results—continued 
ROA -6.739*** -6.691*** -6.805*** -5.976*** -5.980*** -6.079*** -5.797*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return -0.162 -0.146 -0.259 1.525 1.667 1.643 -1.041 
 (0.977) (0.980) (0.967) (0.797) (0.794) (0.611) (0.813) 
BM 0.068 0.067 0.060 0.120 0.120 0.119 -0.006 
 (0.803) (0.808) (0.810) (0.643) (0.643) (0.675) (0.986) 
Tobin’s Q 0.050** 0.048** 0.052** 0.049*** 0.048* 0.051 0.058 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.036) (0.006) (0.057) (0.110) (0.126) 
Leverage 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Audit -0.763*** -0.837*** -0.749*** -0738*** -0.764*** -0.705*** -0.733*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
Intercept -3.224*** -3.264*** -3.334*** -3.324*** -3.309*** -3.344*** -3.762*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 42450 42450 42450 52017 52017 52017 41232 
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.028 
Chi-square (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
